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WHY WILL THE ONGOING CRISIS MAKE THE 
REGION MORE VULNERABLE TO SECURITY 
ISSUES? 
The crisis which was triggered by a set of sanctions 
imposed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt followed by 
several Arab states to isolate Qatar has strong re-
gional implications beyond the Gulf. The pressure 
that has been exerted on Qatar is not an isolated ef-
fort; it is a part of a larger scale planning to shape the 
future order of the region. It is not a new effort ei-
ther, as Qatar was targeted with sanctions by the 
Gulf countries before, lately in 2014. An ardent sup-
porter of the anti-status quo movements during the 
so-called Arab Spring, Qatar drew the ire of some 
Arab states who have high stakes in the preservation 
of the regional status quo. 
Qatar, a small peninsula-state with rich gas and 
oil resources, pursued a somewhat independent 
and consistent policy of supporting anti-status quo 
movements starting from the Tunisian revolution 
to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. In addition to 
supporting these movements, the Al-Jazeera Net-
work - the effective tool of the Qatari soft power- 
played a crucial role in opening up the media to the 
voice of the opposition across the region and in in-
ternationalizing the locals’ aspirations. The Muslim 
Brotherhood and its regional offshoots have not 
been the sole actors of change in the region; but 
they remained at the epicenter of the anti-status 
quo demonstrations and revolutions. Qatar sup-
ported non-Brotherhood groups as well. Yet, Qatar 
came to be identified with the Brotherhood and 
other Islamist political movements. The declared 
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reasons for the current crisis fall short in establish-
ing a strong case against Qatar in terms of its al-
leged support of terror and ties with Iran, both of 
which are seemingly being used as a front to garner 
regional and international support for the sanc-
tions. Rather, one could rightfully argue, the cur-
rent crisis is driven mostly by the Qatari support for 
anti-status quo movements in general and the Mus-
lim Brotherhood and its offshoots in particular, and 
is aimed at curbing Qatar’s regional policies rang-
ing from Libya to Syria.
The Qatar crisis is a political maneuver whose 
longer-term consequences have not been calculated 
skillfully. If the crisis continues and deepens, it will 
make the region and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) members much weaker and fragmented 
against imminent security challenges in the region 
including Iranian expansionism, extremism, and 
terrorism. The crisis furthers the polarization in the 
region, forcing regional countries to choose between 
the two poles, and thereby creating a bipolar region-
al system. This bipolarity is rejected by many region-
al actors, including, among others, Turkey, Kuwait, 
and Oman. 
In the initial stage of the isolation campaign, the 
anti-Qatar coalition may use this push as leverage in 
their regional policies, but the lack of international 
support for the sanctions and half-hearted support 
by some regional countries will undermine the sus-
tainability of the sanctions, making it quite difficult 
for the anti-Qatar coalition to remain united. There 
are already differences of opinion among the coali-
tion members with regard to the extent of the sanc-
tions and their effectiveness in bringing about 
change in Qatar’s engagements in foreign policy. The 
disparities among the coalition members coupled 
with an increasing international pressure to resolve 
the crisis will likely pave the way for the creation of a 
middle ground. Yet, the underlying causes of the cri-
sis and the regional polarization created by the crisis 
will remain intact and keep creating tension in the 
Gulf and beyond. Meanwhile, a question on two dif-
ferent levels deserves an answer: Does this polariza-
tion make the region safer? More specifically, does 
this polarization make the Gulf monarchies who are 
part of the anti-Qatar coalition safer? 
WHAT ARE THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF 
ISOLATION?
The Middle East is much more fragile than it was 
six years ago, and further polarization is not an an-
tidote to this unstable environment. Failed states, 
sectarian conflict, unmet social and political expec-
tations, rise of violent non-state actors and great 
powers that are less interested in the region are the 
developments that need to be taken into account 
when making wholescale plans about the region. 
More than six years after the Syrian Civil War began 
and with the ongoing civil wars in Yemen, Libya 
and Iraq and the political instability in Lebanon, 
the region’s future abounds with uncertainties.
What is certain is that it will take time to re-
build state structures, failed states will remain a re-
gion-wide phenomenon, violent non-state actors 
will maintain their influence, and it will be a Hercu-
lean task to uproot communal and sectarian strife 
even in the post-conflict Middle East. This fragility 
does not create suitable grounds for a sustainable 
regional order and stability any time soon. None of 
the regional powers or the great powers can design 
a sustainable order in the region without taking 
other actors into consideration, although some 
countries such as Iran highly benefit from the capa-
bilities of its regional proxies and the realities on the 
ground. Israel, likewise, will keep creating its own 
ground-level realities at the expense of the Palestin-
ians and the Arab world in general. This is a lesson 
regional countries should have learned from the ex-
periences of the Syrian Civil War and the ongoing 
civil wars in Iraq and Yemen. 
The second important lesson that the region 
learned in the last several years is that the regional 
interests of the great powers such as the U.S., Russia 
and the EU countries are, at most, partial. In other 
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words, they are not interested in negotiating a holis-
tic order for the region, but are satisfied with their 
zones of influence in the fragmented states. The great 
powers are not willing to challenge the status quo, 
and they do not want to risk further tensions with 
other great powers for the purpose of expanding 
their zones of influence. Unless the proxy terrorist 
organizations target their interests or target them di-
rectly, they will not risk their political standing to 
formulate a holistic order that would encompass the 
entire region. It is, therefore, of utmost importance 
for the region’s countries to come together for reach-
ing a mutually acceptable and sustainable order for 
the region, instead of banking on the great powers’ 
favorable interferences. 
Building a polarizing and aggressive foreign 
policy depending solely on U.S. support will prove to 
be counterproductive for the anti-Qatar coalition. 
One should be reminded that the Obama adminis-
tration’s policy towards the Middle East, which 
paved the way for Iranian expansionism and the 
proliferation of violent non-state actors, left behind a 
very negative legacy in terms of regional security. 
For example, Saudi Arabia has dire security vulnera-
bilities which will not evaporate abruptly even with 
the Trump administration. As a reaction to Obama’s 
regional policy, Saudis tried to diversify their foreign 
and security policy options and pursued the forma-
tion of new alliances. Diversifications of security op-
tions in the wake of state and non-state threats and 
reaching a regional consensus against these threats 
are necessary to encounter the risks in the medium 
to long term. Therefore, it would prove to be risky 
for KSA to return to a security policy which is de-
tached from regional consensus and dependent 
completely on the Trump administration. 
Furthermore, every time regional actors such 
as KSA and Iran raise the bar by making agree-
ments with great powers, they force their oppo-
nents to engage in an effort to balance their moves. 
At the end of this never-ending security dilemma 
none of the actors feel more secure; however, the 
great powers and the local militias and terrorist or-
ganizations prevail and benefit from the ongoing 
and gradually escalating tensions. The situation 
mostly strengthens the positions of extra-regional 
powers. Terrorist groups that are sponsored during 
this proxy struggle are also the short-term benefi-
ciaries of the security dilemma. However, in the 
long run, as was the case in the Afghan War, spon-
soring violent non-state actors with terror links is 
counterproductive, at best, and, sooner rather than 
later, backfires.
To be more specific, the current move against 
Qatar is not based on an insightful perspective that 
would enable sustainable security in the region. It 
is rather a backward-looking maneuver that aims 
to punish the actors that inspired and facilitated the 
“Arab Spring.” Silencing moderate Islamist voices 
that find space to express themselves in Qatar will 
only move them underground – it will not change 
their status as a political and sociological reality in 
Arab societies. More importantly, the struggle 
against the more extremist and pro-violence terror-
ist groups will be more difficult if the legitimate po-
litical channels are closed to moderate Islamic voic-
es. Consequently, under the new conditions the re-
gional actors’ priority should not be to punish the 
conditions that enabled the “Arab Spring.” 
The anti-Qatar coalition’s preoccupation with 
the “Arab Spring” leads them to misread the re-
gion’s new security environment. The most effec-
tive way to maintain both the regime security and 
the regional security would be to unite their ranks 
by expanding the coalition against actors of region-
al instability and growing terrorist threats and to 
de-escalate sectarian tensions rather than fueling 
them. Further polarization throughout the region 
and a Middle East cold war with a potential to cause 
more escalation is a lose-lose situation for the re-
gion with the exception of certain states which have 
shown their ability to increase their influence 
during times of instability and chaos, such as Israel, 
Iran and the UAE. 
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HOW WOULD THE QATAR CRISIS AFFECT 
REGIONAL CONFLICTS?
The current crisis is not solely an intra-Gulf rift; it is 
about a larger political conflict in the MENA region. 
It is more about Qatar’s regional policies than the 
state’s intra-Gulf policies. It will therefore have a 
strong impact on a number of regional conflicts in 
which Qatar and the anti-Qatar coalition have stakes 
and are competing for influence, including but not 
limited to Libya, Syria, and Palestine. In all these 
conflict zones, geopolitical considerations are surely 
at play; however, ideological struggle has also been 
instrumentalized in these conflicts, further compli-
cating the efforts to resolve them. Struggle for power 
accented by ideological struggle turned into a de-
structive regional phenomenon, paving way for re-
gional escalations. One could argue that the afore-
mentioned conflicts deteriorate the intra-Gulf rival-
ries; while the securitization of these conflicts in the 
lines of intra-Gulf ideological struggle is in turn 
sharpening the positions of the conflicting sides, 
thereby deepening these conflicts. The Qatar crisis 
both stems from and feeds the ongoing conflicts.
The UAE and Egypt, key actors of the Qatar cri-
sis, have also been key actors in the Libya conflict. 
Egyptian military intelligence has been supporting 
the Tobruk authority led by General Hafter militarily 
and logistically; while the UAE bankrolled the coup 
and has since helped Hafter financially, politically, 
and militarily. Libya is arguably the first step of the 
Gulf effort to combat the anti-status quo forces of 
the Arab Spring. The UAE and Egypt do not recog-
nize the internationally recognized government of 
Tripoli, and have long invested in Libya to shape the 
politics of the war-torn state. With the current crisis, 
the UAE and Egypt are directly targeting Qatar’s pol-
icy in Libya and trying to delegitimize Qatar’s part-
ners in Libya in a bid to strengthen the Libyan House 
of Representatives at the expense of the General Na-
tional Congress to enable Hafter’s domination of the 
Government of National Accord, the legitimate gov-
ernment of Libya. Therefore, if Qatar caves in to the 
pressure in Libya, the UAE and Egypt will delegiti-
mize all groups rejecting Hafter’s domination, some 
of whom have recently been designated as terrorists 
by the anti-Qatar coalition. It is completely improb-
able that the Emirati and Egyptian reshaping of Lib-
yan politics will bring stability; to the contrary, it will 
deepen the tensions, escalate the armed conflict, and 
ensure the failure of political negotiations. 
Although Qatar and anti-Qatar coalitions are 
not in direct confrontation in Syria, they differ in 
their vision for Syria. As a matter of fact, the an-
ti-Qatar coalition have their own differences too. 
Saudis used to be more active in Syria and still see no 
place for Assad in the future of the country; while 
the UAE and Egypt have been dealing with the Syri-
an regime, prioritize the fight against Islamic move-
ments over the Iranian threat and Assad’s crimes, 
and are willing to accept Assad staying in power. The 
UAE and Egypt created their own “opposition” (Syr-
ia’s Tomorrow Movement) led by the former head of 
the Syrian National Coalition and established Quw-
wat al-Nukhbat (Elite Forces), which has been fight-
ing alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces in East-
ern Syria. Qatar’s proxies are located mostly in the 
northern and northwestern parts of the country. Yet, 
the UAE and Egypt extend the competition and ani-
mosity towards Qatar to Syria by accusing Qatar of 
supporting terror in Syria. 
Restraining Qatari support for Syrian opposi-
tion groups would have strong humanitarian impli-
cations as Qatari foundations, some of which have 
been recently designated as terrorists have been 
quite active and doing humanitarian work inside 
Syria and helping refugees outside the country. Fur-
thermore, Qatari-backed groups have been instru-
mental in keeping the Iranian-backed militias in 
Syria in check; in this sense, Qatar, unlike any of the 
Gulf countries, has taken action to counterbalance 
Iran in Syria. Without the Qatari-backed groups, the 
Syrian regime forces and the Iranian influence would 
strengthen, raising the security vulnerabilities in the 
Gulf region and beyond.
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Palestine is at the epicenter of the current crisis. 
The UAE and Egyptian approach - which is similar 
to that of Israel - is shaping the anti-Qatar coalition’s 
stance regarding Palestine. Emirati foreign policy 
reads Palestine through the lens of its proxy, Mu-
hammad Dahlan, former security chief in Gaza, 
whom the UAE wants to replace Abbas. Qatar has 
been home to several Hamas leaders since they left 
Damascus at the beginning of the Syrian crisis after 
refusing to support a pro-Assad line. The current 
crisis targets Hamas, and aims to force Qatar to cease 
its support of the Hamas movement. King Salman of 
Saudi Arabia met the leaders of Hamas in 2015 in a 
bid to rally the Arab world against Iran. Hamas has 
been at odds with Iran since 2011, refusing later Ira-
nian attempts to patronize the movement. Iran’s at-
tempts aimed at repairing its image in the Sunni 
world, an image that has been in ruins as a result of 
the Iranian involvement in the Syrian war. 
Hamas has its own financial and political prob-
lems, and recently changed its leader and declared a 
political vision in which the movement denied or-
ganic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE 
and Egypt as well as certain cliques within the Saudi 
establishment discredited Hamas’s new vision, and 
asked Qatar to cut its ties to the Palestinian move-
ment. The regional isolation of Hamas would not 
end its sociological and political reality in Palestine; 
nor would it deescalate the rift between Palestinian 
factions. This will in turn embolden Israel and 
strengthen its bargaining hand vis-à-vis the Pales-
tinians. The Arab world’s interests lie in the unity of 
the Palestinians, and further polarization and divi-
sions within the Palestinian ranks benefit nobody 
apart from Israel.
HOW CAN THE SECURITY DILEMMA BE 
OVERCOME? 
There is a clear mutual misunderstanding and lack of 
empathy among major actors in the region. One 
group of actors does not understand the concerns 
about regime security (or concerns about maintain-
ing the monarchies), while the other camp does not 
necessarily appreciate the concerns about national 
security. It is therefore necessary to ensure that all 
actors understand the others’ concerns and limita-
tions, and respect the others’ major security con-
cerns. For the time being, it is virtually impossible to 
institutionalize a collective security infrastructure 
that would defeat sectarianism and violent extrem-
ism in the region. 
The region-wide “cold war” with strong ideo-
logical undertones, which seems to be the main 
motive of the coalition that is trying to isolate Qa-
tar, should be undesirable for the countries in the 
region. An attrition war through proxies may be 
the order of such a “cold war.” This would further 
fuel the region’s tensions. The option which seems 
more feasible in this moment is to form a strategy 
of balance of powers in the region. Respecting the 
autonomies and zones of influence of major actors 
and even partial alliances may be possible under 
such a system. A mutually agreed process of aban-
doning violent proxies should be one of the precon-
ditions of such a balance. 
While a regional “cold war” is being created, 
actors like Qatar and Turkey are pressurized to pick 
sides in this vicious circle of avoidable conflict. 
Meanwhile, Iran is benefitting from such a polar-
ization by mobilizing its sectarian militias and con-
solidating its power at home and in the region. 
When it comes to sectarian mobilization, Iran’s ca-
pabilities are unmatched in the region. The experi-
ences in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and most strikingly 
Syria have demonstrated the Iranian capabilities in 
sectarian mobilization; capabilities that have prov-
en detrimental to the Gulf states’ interests in the 
region. The recent support given by the Trump ad-
ministration was the development that encouraged 
the KSA- and UAE-led coalition. 
The Gulf states, after the difficult relations with 
the Obama administration especially for the last 
couple of years, considered the election of Donald 
Trump as U.S. president as a golden opportunity to 
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change the course of relations with the U.S. Trump 
has a different and more pragmatic view of the order 
in the region. The lavish arms deal of Saudi leaders 
may probably have changed Trump’s view but it is 
not clear whether the military and bureaucratic es-
tablishment will completely embrace Trump’s new 
“friendship.” It is clear that Trump’s recent Saudi 
Arabia visit and the diplomatic contacts between the 
younger generation Gulf leaders Muhammad bin 
Salman, the deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia, 
Muhammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of the 
UAE, and Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner 
played an important role in the planning of the cur-
rent sanctions against Qatar. Trump himself reiterat-
ed his support for the isolation of Qatar, while the 
Pentagon stated that Qatar is one of the U.S.A.’s clos-
est allies in the fight against terror. 
The Gulf countries need to take into consider-
ation that the Trump administration is not giving 
them a carte blanche. They may eventually find 
themselves against a more aggressive Iran but this 
time without diminishing regional and more impor-
tantly U.S. backing. It is far too risky to put all one’s 
eggs in one basket, namely that of the U.S. The over-
use of economic resources such as security and dip-
lomatic tools may also backfire. The countries that 
are threatened economically may eventually over-
come their economic losses but they may not forget 
the hostilities they experienced. 
CONCLUSION
The Qatar crisis is the latest episode of a political and 
ideological struggle that has been raging since the 
beginning of the popular protests in the Arab world 
in 2011. The so-called Arab Spring created a regional 
cold war in which the conflicting sides have been 
mobilizing all of their military, financial and diplo-
matic tools to compete for power and influence in 
the post-Arab Spring order. The ideological struggle 
between the pro-change and pro-status quo poles 
has been one of the major dynamics in the current 
conflicts in the Middle East. The struggle has been 
shaping regional conflicts while also being shaped by 
them. Meanwhile, the geopolitical rivalry between 
Iran and the Gulf deepens. In this sense, the Gulf 
countries are involved in two simultaneous rivalries: 
an intra-Gulf rivalry with strong ideological under-
tones, and a geopolitical rivalry with Iran in which 
sectarianism is instrumentalized. 
The intra-Gulf rivalry lately exemplified by the 
Qatar crisis is creating further vulnerabilities for the 
Gulf, shifting its focus away from the actual threat 
coming from Iran and regional proxies. In other 
words, the intra-Gulf rivalry is dividing the ranks of 
the GCC and paralyzing the Council’s abilities to face 
the imminent security challenges in the region in-
cluding Iranian expansionism, extremism, and ter-
rorism. Overreliance on U.S. support, dividing the 
Arab world along ideological lines, pursuing proxy 
wars against fellow Arab states, and the marginaliza-
tion of strong political and social currents in the re-
gion are not serving the best interest of the Gulf, in 
particular, and the Middle East, in general. To this 
end, it would be wiser for the Gulf countries to focus 
more on the imminent security challenges by uniting 
ranks and resolving the ongoing regional conflicts. 
